Insight into the Work of the German Federal Constitutional Court

It was a particular privilege that Professor Grimm, as the inaugural guest of the series, provided a deeply personal and reflective account of constitutional adjudication, exploring its human, professional, and ethical dimensions. At the outset of his lecture, he addressed the question of how one becomes a constitutional judge. He emphasized that, above all, one must first become a good lawyer: the position of a constitutional judge is not a consciously pursued career goal, but a vocation to which one becomes suited through personal integrity and professional competence. The essential qualities, he noted, are impartiality, openness, and intellectual curiosity. Drawing on his own example, he illustrated that the path to the constitutional bench often rests on scholarly credibility and intellectual independence—he himself came from an academic background and had no political affiliations.

Speaking about the operation of the Federal Constitutional Court, Professor Grimm highlighted the importance of the institution’s relationship with society. He also discussed the symbolic design of the Karlsruhe courthouse, which embodies openness and transparency. This symbolism, he noted, is not merely architectural but deeply embedded in the court’s ethos: following a controversial decision that sparked public protests, security staff proposed the construction of a fence. The judges, however, rejected the idea, holding that the court must remain accessible to the public—an attitude that continues to define its institutional identity.

In comparing international constitutional practices, Grimm underscored that German constitutional adjudication is characterized by a particularly strong tradition of deliberative decision-making. Judicial opinions are formed through confidential and collegial discussions in which dissenting opinions are viewed as an integral and valuable part of the legal process. He contrasted this with models such as Brazil’s, where judicial deliberations are broadcast publicly, arguing that such visibility would likely inhibit genuine dialogue: judges might address the audience rather than one another, making intellectual self-correction more difficult.

Regarding the relationship between the court and politics, Grimm adopted a pragmatic stance: “We work with what politics has created.” At the same time, he stressed that political affiliation plays only a marginal role in the daily work of German constitutional judges—at least in the senate in which he served.

Professor Dieter Grimm’s lecture offered an academically rigorous yet personal perspective on the practice of constitutional adjudication in Germany. He emphasized that judicial work is not merely a matter of legal technique, but a process of responsible decision-making that requires professional expertise, human sensitivity, and self-reflection.